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Societies have gone to war for as long as there have been organized groups of people, and 
if some are to be believed, long before the development of society. While many factors and 
realities of war have evolved throughout the millennia a few characteristics have remained 
constant. War is a violent and destructive activity that is conducted with the hopes of achieving a 
political goal. War has always been limited by the technologies available to the warring parties, 
but it was not until the development of atomic energy that an atomic weapon became feasible. 
Planes drastically increased the scope and range of military operations from the pre-aeronautical 
period.1 Sociopolitical forces have always shaped the nature of the conflict in one manner or 
another. Northern Native American warfare was limited in nature and more closely related to a 
religious ceremony than to a full-scale European war, the limited nature was directly caused by 
the sociopolitical context of what violence was used for and how tribes interacted with each 
other.2 However, the social-political realities of Europe were vastly different, leading to large-
scale wars such as the 100 Years War, 80 Years War, and the 30 Years War. This form of 
warfare developed over the generations as a reaction to Europe's unique political climate.3  
While other factors have remained constant throughout warfare’s long and bloody 
history, the technology and social-political realities are perhaps the most instrumental in 
affecting the nature of a current conflict, which, in turn, could influence the nature and structure 
of a nation's military high command. Concerning the development of high command and their 
military doctrine, technological and sociopolitical factors play a crucial role. Through this 
research, I argue that sociopolitical factors are more formative in the development of military 
 
1 Max Boot, War Made New: Weapons, Warriors, and the Making of the Modern World. (New York: Gotham Books, 
2006) 295-297. 
2 Gene A Smith, David Coffey, and Kyle Longley, In Harm’s Way: a History of the American Military Experience. 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2020) 10-13. 
3 Christion I. Archer, John R. Ferris, Holger H. Herwig, and Timothy H. E. Travels, World History of Warfare. (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2002) 217-220. 
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leadership than technological factors in modern western war. To discover the nature of the 
relationship, this research will consist of two case studies: first the Union Army during the 
American Civil War and the U.S. Army during the Second World War.  
What exactly does the term high military command mean? While the term has different 
meanings concerning certain armies and nations, this paper defines the term "high command” as 
the leaders most directly responsible for the two highest levels of war, the political and strategic 
levels. The political level of war refers to the political goal and objective for the entire conflict, it 
gives the war a definition of victory. Within the 21st Century American context, this level 
directly involves the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense, and 
the service secretaries. Within the political level, war is designed and institutionalized through a 
top-down approach. The President and their Security Council dictate the rules of engagement, 
the escalation of force, and the public message regarding the war.  The strategic level of war 
involves the chief military planners and commanders of a nation's military and the relevant 
political leaders. Within this level of war, a strategy is created to achieve the policy objective 
created by the political leadership. Within the modern American system, this level includes the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the heads of the intelligence agencies. The last two lower levels of war, 
the operational and tactical levels of war, deal more with the conduct of war.4 Though this 
system was not yet created by the time of the American Civil War, the National Defense Act of 
1947 is the law that formalized the policies that had developed and evolved throughout the 
history of the United States. The current military command structure is the successor of the 
command structures of the nation’s early days.  
 
4 USAF, “Levels of War,” Curtis E. Lemay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, February 27, 2015. 
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The American Civil War 
In his work, War Made New: Weapons, Warriors and the Making of the Modern World, 
Max Boot examines the impact that technological advancements have had upon the larger field 
of military science and the conduct of war. The focus of his work is global and does not always 
draw upon the American way of war. However, his work provides insight into the trends that 
developed during a period, which is why I am using this his work to provide context. The 
American Civil War in the 1860s occurred during a turning point in global history. The Industrial 
Revolution was in full swing having started in Great Britain in the 1750s, however, the impacts 
of the revolution were not yet certain. Both technology and society were caught in between the 
traditional status quo and the allure of change. Military affairs were not immune to change, and 
militaries often embraced technological changes. One such change that the European militaries 
embraced was the railroad. Prussia spent much of the 1800s developing an extensive rail system 
that the state could utilize in times of national crisis. Also, the Prussian General Staff drafted 
mobilization plans that relied upon this rail network by the mid-1800s.5 The steam engine was 
not only used to power trains during this time but ships as well. In the United States, civilian 
steamships were used extensively on the many rivers for trade and transportation. Militarily, the 
steamships allowed troops to be reliably transported upriver and allowed for the development of 
ironside ships.6 The steam engine was also used in many factories in the United States to 
increase the manufacturing capacity of the factories.7 Faster manufacturing proved to be crucial 
for producing the war material for the Civil War. The manufacturing process was standardized, 
and interchangeable parts were introduced, providing for greater maintenance of equipment. By 
 
5 Boot, War Made New, 125-126.  
6 Boot, War Made New, 174-175. 
7 Boot, War Made New, 110. 
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the mid-1860s militaries had started integrating rifled repeating firearms into their armories. 
Additionally, artillery pieces became rifled, improving accuracy and range.8  
In many regards, the American Civil War was a catastrophe that was impossible to avoid 
given the volatile political and social climate brewing in the first half of the Nineteenth Century. 
The United States of America had rapidly increased the size of its territory growing from thirteen 
states to thirty, not including the territories, by 1848. Some of the new lands were bought while 
other swaths of land were won through military conquest. With the addition of every new state to 
the Union, a fierce debate ensued surrounding the West: would new states or territory be free or 
permit slavery? Congress attempted to mediate the debate by passing laws intended to create an 
orderly system based upon lines drawn upon the map. However, these acts were not always 
enough nor soon enough. Conflict broke out in the 1850s in key slave states over their fear that 
slavery could be banned from the Union. These violent riots culminated in Bleeding Kansas in 
1854 which further increased growing social tensions engulfing the country. 9 
The election of Republican Abraham Lincoln as president in 1860 was the final catalyst 
for the beginning of the American Civil War. Lincoln and the Republican Party included in their 
platform anti-slavery rhetoric and southern states feared that the Republican victory would lead 
to the end of slavery. Southern states viewed the Republican platform as an affront to their rights 
as states and the social system established upon slavery, resulting in the secession of eleven 
Southern states from the Union.10 The secession crisis was not by of itself enough to cause the 
outbreak of war. War did not begin until Confederate troops fired upon the Union-held Fort 
 
8 Boot, War Made New, 127-130.  
9 Smith, In Harm’s Way, 220-221. 
10 Smith, In Harm’s Way, 221. 
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Sumter in Charleston, South Carolina on April 12, 1861, forcing the Union to surrender the 
fort.11  
The original policy objective for the Union during the American Civil War was to restore 
the Union as swiftly as possible with the least number of American casualties. As the war 
dragged on, the political situation changed, and the potential involvement of European powers on 
the side of the Confederacy, the policy objective expanded to include the emancipation of 
American slaves in January 1863.12 The Union struggled to develop a coherent strategy for most 
of the war and often granted preferential treatment to the Eastern Theater because both countries' 
capitals, as political centers of gravity were located there.13  
  Before the war's beginning, the were several important developments concerning military 
technologies as well as civilian technology that was repurposed for military use. Perhaps one of 
the most crucial of these developments was the advent of the steam engine. Riverboats were able 
to easily and with great speed for the day carry cargo upstream. While being able to sail 
upstream might not seem all that revolutionary by standards today, but before the steam engine, 
it was exceedingly difficult to fight powerful currents to bring goods and supplies upstream on 
major rivers such as the Mississippi. Militarily, steam allowed the U.S. Navy to ship supplies 
upriver to Union troops operating in the surrounding areas, projecting the power of the Union by 
leveraging the industrial might of the Union against the Confederacy. On land, the steam engine 
proved crucial within the Union-controlled rail system. Rail allowed the rapid transport of 
supplies, heavy guns, and troops. What had once required weeks of tiring foot marches could be 
 
11 Bruce Catton, The Coming Fury. (New York: Pocket Books, 1967) 304-306. 
12 Allan Reed Millett, Peter Maslowski, and William B. Feis, For the Common Defense a Military History of the 
United States of America. (New York, NY: Free Press, 1994) 163. 
13 Millett, Maslowski, and Feis, For the Common Defense, 170-172. 
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completed in mere days on the rail with little to no strain on the troops, increasing the lethality of 
the troops. Even so, the foot march would resume once the troops disembarked from the train. In 
addition to the steam engine, the newly developed telegraphic was an equally important 
development. The telegraph allowed for instant communication to the front from both the 
strategic and political leadership located in Washington D.C., increasing the ability for the high 
command to influence the outcomes of the war by being involved more heavily in the conduct of 
war planning.14  
Concerning military technology, rifles had improved over the century leading to a more 
lethal fighting force, especially when paired with the traditional battle formations of the day. 
Artillery had not seen any drastic improvement but the ability to move guns more rapidly with 
rail did play a role in increasing the use of large guns. Upon the water, the navy developed more 
heavily armored ships known as the ironclads to conduct riverine operations and coastal 
bombardment. Also, during the war, submarines were experimented with to some degree.15  
Field armies lacked basic maps as the Army had failed to conduct intensive geological 
surveying of the country except for the Western Territory. Even after generals ordered maps to 
be charted, they were often inaccurate. Mapmakers sometimes knew that they would not be 
accurate and warned that the best the map could do was not to mislead the armies.16 As late as 
1862 maps prepared for campaigns were unusable, inaccurate, and costly. Some commanders 
bought maps from local shops to understand where they were. The Army of the Potomac rarely 
had access to reliable maps of northern Virginia until mid-1863, which was their area of 
 
14 Edward Hagerman, The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare. (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 198) 40. 
15 Boot, War Made New, 116-130. 
16 Williams, Lincoln and His Generals, 5-6.   
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operations for the past two years. It was not until the last year of the war did a staff office in 
Washington open whose responsibility was communicating to commanders which railroads were 
under military control and could be used for their campaigns. 17 
Even so, the technological realities for the Union Army were the best it had ever been up 
to that point. The American military had traditionally been a smaller, less funded force than other 
contemporary states. Naval shipbuilding was often restricted to times of war. Congress did not 
make it easy for the Army to buy or develop new weapon systems or experiment with developing 
technologies. For instance, British officers noted in 1864 that Union Armies had very few rifled 
artillery pieces of large caliber, while many of the cannons used were similar to the ones used by 
the armies of Napoleon at the beginning of the century. Before the war, the Army adopted two 
new rifled muskets for service, the Enfield rifled musket and the Springfield Model 1861 which 
both fired the .58-caliber Minie ball. Both rifles had been bought in small numbers but had not 
yet been integrated into field units. The use of the Minie ball itself was a drastic improvement in 
military technologies, increased range, accuracy, and lethality due to the shape of the weapon 
system. When the Minie ball entered the body, it would tear the flesh of the victim and shatter 
bones often forcing surgeons to amputate the affected limb to prevent gangrene. In addition to 
the improvements in firearm technology during the Civil War, the Union Army had to contend 
with the South’s heavy usage of mines during the war. Key waterways and rail lines were often 
mined by the defending Confederates. These rail mines forced the Union Army to devise 
methods of clearing and handling mines.18 The Union Army created the first rolling mine 
 
17 Williams, Lincoln and His Generals, 5-7. 




clearing roller which was deployed in advance of their locomotives to detonate any enemy mines 
on the track before the valuable locomotive could.  
Within society, the Army was in the process of undergoing a process of professionalism 
that began after the War of 1812. Society saw these reforms as a necessity, hoping to prevent the 
state of unreadiness that the Army was in when the War of 1812 began.  Increased 
professionalism heavily affected the officer corps made up of mostly regulars and West Point 
graduates. One key aspect of the reforms was the establishment of a core made up of 
professional officers trained in the hard sciences.19 Engineering was selected as the primary 
major field for West Point, and the school taught that “military professionalism [was] a mastery 
of applied scientific and mathematical principles.”20 The use of historical analysis was 
abandoned when teaching strategy, relying instead upon a prescriptive method, limiting the 
scope of tactics and strategies taught at West Point. Even so, American society started to view 
these men as elitist and distant from the rest of society which might have reinforced the ideas of 
fighting in a gentleman-like fashion that was very much entrenched during the military cultures 
of the world at the time. These sentiments started to develop between the War of 1812 and the 
Mexican American War.21 Due to a long-standing social view, much of the Army in wartime 
were ill-trained citizen-soldiers, a tradition dating back to the colonial era when the colonies' 
only defense was the militia.22 The inferior quality of these citizen-soldiers impacted the military 
effectiveness and strategic effectiveness of the Army. In the Mexican and Civil Wars, volunteers 
enlisted into state units but served under federal authority.23  
 
19 Hagerman. The American, 31-33. 
20 Hagerman. The American, 32. 
21 Hagerman, The American, 31-33. 
22 Smith, In Harm’s Way, 14-17.  
23 Smith, In Harm’s Way, 255. 
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Organizing enlistees into states might have seemed like a promising idea at the time but it 
had its drawbacks. Fighting in the Civil War was extremely fierce and bloody, it was not out of 
the realm of possibilities for entire units to face mass casualty events during a single battle and 
become combat ineffective. In the Army, a mass casualty event is when present medical support 
is unable to handle a sudden increase in patients.24 Additionally, a unit has sustained losses 
upwards of 30 percent of their combat power is considered combat ineffective.25 As units were 
often drawn and organized by towns and states, a whole town could suffer heavily in the span of 
an afternoon if the electing officers, were ineffective when assigning soldiers to units. Even if 
this system was not the best militarily it was a political necessity. American military leaders had 
begun to understand that American citizen-soldiers were not volunteering to serve the federal 
government but their states. The fact that citizen soldiers were not serving the federal 
government was shown very plainly during the War of 1812. State militia commanders on 
several occasions during the War of 1812 refused to take part in offensives that did not directly 
impact their state’s security as their men were not fighting to protect America but to protect their 
own home. It was not until after the American Civil War that the idea that citizens were first an 
American and then a citizen of that state, so many Americans did not view America as their 
home requiring their sacrifice. However, if commanders kept state groups together in single 
units, it would instill a stronger fighting spirit in the troops, as the perceived threat to their 
community would feel more urgent due to the fact the men of their state were committed to the 
battle. Additionally, it was much easier for the government to raise its mass army when each 
 
24 Joint Trauma System Battlefield Trauma Educational Program, Mass Casualty and Triage, 2020.  
25 Headquarters Department of the Army. Ranger Handbook TC 3-21.76. District of Columbia: 2017. 15-1-15-3. 
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state created its division of volunteers instead of attempting to place the new volunteers into the 
Army’s preexisting units.  
The U.S. Army was completely unprepared for the war in 1861. The Commanding 
General of the Army, General Winfield Scott, at the onset of the war, was one of two officers 
who had any experience in commanding a force larger than a brigade in the field. At 75, Scott 
was too old to lead in the field.26  The other officer who had any command experience was 
General John E. Wool, who was beginning to show signs of dementia.27 The lack of experienced 
field officers in the Union Army had deadly consequences for the Union soldier. Officers had to 
learn how to command, organize, and employ large forces while on the field, causing many 
deaths and injuries.28 Furthermore, the curriculum at West Point, where most Union officers 
received their commissions from, did not focus heavily upon military sciences. Instead, most 
officers from West Point had received civil engineering education and had less knowledge of the 
theories of war or the conduct of European-style warfare. Officers in the Army were expected to 
build fortifications and fight against Native Americans on the frontier, not conduct large-scale 
military campaigns with field armies requiring logistical support and a higher strategic goal. The 
Army lacked schools to teach their field officers the complexities of command, strategic 
planning, and logistical operations.29 Within the staff bureaus, only the Quartermaster General’s 
staff could shift quickly from peacetime operations to wartime operations, but no bureau had 
conducted any prewar planning. This reality continued through much of the war, the Union 
Army lacked, for the most part, a unified strategy.30 Scott proposed his now-famous Anaconda 
 
26 Thomas Harry Williams, Lincoln and His Generals (New York: Alfred A. Knopf) 3-4. 
27 Williams, Lincoln and His Generals, 4. 
28 Williams, Lincoln and His Generals, 4. 
29 Williams, Lincoln and His Generals, 4-6. 
30 Williams, Lincoln and His Generals, 5. 
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Plan in 1861, yet the rest of the Army did not implement the plan until 1864. Until then, theater 
commanders conducted their war as they saw fit with little thought on how this might affect the 
overall war effort. Furthermore, most of the Union's attention and war efforts focused on the 
Eastern Theater, which was the smallest theater of the war, containing primarily Virginia. It was 
within this theater that the Army of the Potomac fought.  
For much of the war, President Lincoln was the chief strategist. Even though he had no 
military experience, he better grasped the situation than his undertrained officers who had not led 
large forces into battle. Many times, the president drafted and revised plans for campaigns that 
he directed his generals to conduct. President Lincoln also personally directed tactical 
movements of troops and units during the battle from Washington. Today, his direct involvement 
might seem like a gross overreach, but Lincoln’s actions were in keeping with the contemporary 
role of the civilian leader. During America’s prior military conflicts, the president had taken a 
direct role in the planning of operations by directing the policy objective, and the advent of the 
telegraph allowed Lincoln to extend this influence on the tactical level. Even if it was considered 
normal for the times, most of Lincoln’s generals were not accustomed to including civilian 
leadership in their war planning. Sometimes Lincoln planned an operation for the pleasure of 
planning one and then would present it to his generals with the intent of gauging their reactions. 
His generals often found it difficult to tell the difference between operations that the president 
did not intend to occur from the ones that he desired to occur. This difficulty caused generals to 
plan and execute operations that were never meant to happen to occur.31  
 




For all the mistakes that President Lincoln made regarding his war plans, the president 
correctly understood the Union's strengths against the Confederacy. The Union had a larger 
population than the Confederates, and more of their population was able to join the war effort. 
The Confederates might have been able to conscript more soldiers due to slave labor, but the 
country was not able to finance or arm as large of an army. The president also understood that 
his forces had the backing of a stronger government that could raise and equip larger armies with 
more public support. The Union had the advantage of an established line of credit, allowing the 
state to borrow money to finance the war effort. Additionally, the institutions of the Union were 
established in such a manner that Congress was able to pass the first Income Tax on July 1, 
1862.32 This tax further allowed the Union to finance the war. The Confederate’s government 
was not established in a manner that would make it easy for President Jefferson Davis to raise 
and equip a mass army under unified command as the Union was able to. Lastly, President 
Lincoln understood that his forces held a large industrial advantage over the Rebels. The vast 
majority of the rail in the United States was located within the Union, as were most of the 
factories. While many Army officers defected to the Confederates, much fewer from the Navy 
left, and the Union remained in command of much of the fleet. The retention of naval officers 
gave the Union command of the sea throughout much of the war.33 
President Lincoln held the most direct influence over the selection and promotion of 
high-ranking officers in the military. In particular, the president replaced the commanding 
general of the Army of the Potomac four times throughout the war, due to failures in leadership 
that cost the Union strategically and operationally. However, it was not just the commanding 
 
32 Cynthia G Fox, “Income Tax Records of the Civil War Years,” National Archives and Records Administration 
(National Archives and Records Administration, December 6, 201) 
33 McPherson, Tried, 11, 34-35. 
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generals that the president had the responsibility of selecting, every general officer in the Union 
Army there was an exhaustive list of applicants to choose. Some of those seeking command were 
Regular Army officers who had spent years at the junior level of command. Officers who had 
resigned their commissions to gain civilian employment also applied for the newly created 
positions leaving divisions. Most interestingly, many politicians applied for their positions, 
believing that society would look favorably upon war heroes after the war. The desire to use 
military service as a political advantage shows the relationship between the military and society, 
both influence each other.34   
The president was often not satisfied with the indecisiveness of his generals throughout 
the war and did not find any solace until General Ulysses S. Grant took command of the Union 
Army in 1864. Before then, the commanding generals were often wary of engagements and did 
not press advantages out of fear of making a wrong move. Grant took risks and understood that 
the war must be fought differently than had been previously done if the Union was going to win 
the war. The command situation of the Union Army was not originally established in a way that 
could handle the realities of large-scale modern war, which the Civil War was slowly becoming.  
As the war progressed the American command structure began to modernize, from the 
limited and skeleton staff created in the years after the creation of the country to a more modern 
command system. The most important development was the Congressional reauthorization of the 
rank of lieutenant general in February 1864. This rank had only been held by two officers before 
American history: Georgia Washington and Winfield Scott. The purpose of Congress 
reauthorizing the rank was to create a general in chief of the armies of America at the pleasure of 
 
34 Williams, Lincoln, 10-12. 
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the President.35 This development was both political and strategic. The congressmen that 
proposed the bill were, in fact, close friends of Grant and pushed him for the appointment from 
the start of the debate on the bill. Some of the people in Washington, including the President 
believed that Grant desired to use this newly created position as a springboard to the White 
House. It took the President inquiring about Grant’s presidential aspirations with close friends of 
the General before he would appoint him after he learned that Grant did not want to be 
president.36 Strategically, the position was crucial for ensuring the Union created and 
implemented a coherent strategy. Prior, Army commanders would only worry about operations 
within their theater and would not consider the strategic implications of their actions in the other 
theaters. It would be the responsibility of this new position to construct operational plans for 
every theater that all fed back into the grand strategy which the President approved and directed.  
Grant's decision to establish his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac had a long-
lasting impact on the Army's command system itself. First, the motive in establishing his 
command outside of Washington was an attempt to limit the political influence upon the strategic 
command of the Army to only the President's Cabinet. Congressmen and other bureaucrats 
would not make the trip to Grant's headquarters and the general would have to personally choose 
to place himself within their presence for them to influence his decisions. The President, 
however, would visit Grant’s headquarters when needed or send a telegraph summoning him to 
the White House to discuss matters in private. Secondly, the distance between Grant’s 
headquarters and Washington created the need for a new staff position to be created to facilitate 
coordination and called it the chief of staff. The President appointed General Henry Halleck due 
 
35 Williams, Lincoln, 296-298. 
36 McPherson, Tried, 211-212. 
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to his ability to understand the President's strategic goals and Grant’s candor quickly and 
accurately. Grant would often tell Halleck what he wanted to convey, and Halleck drafted the 
order as he saw fit, helping to reinforce the idea that American officers have leeway with how 
they achieve their missions. 37 
With Grant in charge, the Army's nature moved closer to industrial war, as Grant ordered 
General Sherman in 1864 to target the Confederate's industrial centers in Georgia. Cities were 
burned as were fields and factories. The target for Grant became not the Confederate Army but 
their home front, causing direct harm and hardship upon Confederate civilians. The reasoning 
behind this shift was twofold. First, it was believed that Confederates would lose the will to 
fight, fearing the destruction of their homes and livelihoods. Secondly, Grant and Sherman 
believed that the slash and burn tactics would destroy the economy of the Confederation to such 
a degree that the state would be unable to continue the war. General Sherman was in constant 
communication with Grant while conducting the campaign. Throughout the March to the Sea, 
Grant instructed Sherman on how to operate including the burning of Atlanta and rail lines. All 
of this was done with explicit consent from political leaders in Washington.38   
This kind of warfare would not have been possible without a shift in society. The Union 
was becoming tired of war and was not happy with the growing casualty lists. The President had 
enacted emergency powers to limit Constitutional rights and had turned the war into something 
larger than restoring the Union. All these factors and the slow slide towards totality helped to 
create a situation where the strategy of the Army became the destruction of Confederate armies 
 
37 Williams, Lincoln, 300-305. 
38 Ulysses S. Grant, The Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant: The Complete Annotated Edition. (Cambridge, 




and the wholesale destruction of the South's ability to support its war effort.39 Social pressures 
played a crucial role throughout the American Civil War, in particular the attitudes of the 
Unionists allowed for Sherman’s March to Sea, ordered by Grant to occur in late 1864. If the 
Union had not viewed the Confederates as traitors that needed to be defeated, then politically the 
scorched earth tactic could never be used.  
  Throughout the American Civil War, the command structure of the United States Army 
went through evolutions that were crucial to the development of the modern American command 
system. Technology played a vital role in this evolution, the telegraph allowed for greater 
involvement of both the President of the United States and the general in chief in the strategic 
happens of the war. The vast rail network allowed for quick and organized deployments of Union 
troops causing the development of new offices designed to coordinate between civilian 
businesses and the military. Battlefield operations were also affected by the advancements in 
weaponry that had taken place since the Mexican American War. Naval operations played a role 
in the overall development of a national strategy which in turn helped to develop a more 
sophisticated military staff. Even so, the battlefield tactics used throughout much of the war, line 
tactics, were strongly enforced due to social pressures even in the face of dramatic losses. 
Traditional military thought praised the tactics of Napoleon and Jomini’s written work, strongly 
emphasizes the frontal linear attack and massing of forces. These were some of the tactics that 
Napoleon employed sixty years earlier in Europe and was therefore seen as the peak of European 
tactics.40 Technology had changed, firearms had become deadlier, even so, tactics did not change 
to adapt to the new deadlier reality of modern war. In the face of drastic technological 
 
39 McPherson, Tried, 250-255. 
40 Hagerman, The American, 4-5. 
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advancements, social pressures caused stagnation in military strategy for much of the war. 
Additionally, political factors were crucial for the development of the nature of the war, as the 
appointment of generals was extremely political, General Grant, the organizer of Union victory, 
almost was not appointed to command out of fear that the general would steal political leadership 
away from Lincoln. In fact, it took the president being assured from close friends of the general 
that Grant had no political aspirations for the president to appoint him. The Union’s political and 
economic institutions provided allowed the state to finance, man, and equip the mass armies 
required to win the war. Additionally, public sentiment was crucial in the development of 
Sherman’s March to the Sea, because if the president felt that the slash and burn tactics would 
prove to be politically a death bell, he would never have approved it.  Therefore, social pressures 
impacted the development of the American strategic leadership more than the impacts of 
technology.    
World War Two 
To truly understand the origins of the Second World War it is important to understand the 
end state of the First World War. The Treaty of Versailles signed in 1919, in many ways caused 
the situation in Europe to be precarious at best following the war, Germany was made into a 
weak, albeit moderate, republic, and the once-powerful Austro-Hungarian Empire has broken 
apart. The war also delivered the final blow to the once-great Ottoman Empire, leaving a large 
section of Eastern Europe self-governed for the first time. The 1919 Treaty of Versailles forced 
the Weimar Republic to demilitarize to such an extent that the whole situation was viewed as a 
national insult to the German people. Additionally, the German government was made to pay 
massive reparations to the victors that helped create the hyperinflation that plagued Germany 
before the Great Depression of the 1930s. Ethnic tensions in Europe flared as states desired to 
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unite their dispersed nations in one state. Particularly in Germany, where their populace began to 
accept the reunification of the German peoples after Prussia had prevented all ethnic Germans 
from joining Germany. The treaty also established the League of Nations, which proved to be 
insufficient at preventing war, but did manage to cement the position of Germany, Italy, and 
Imperial Japan as counter to the international order as all three states directly violated the 
League’s mandates and left the organization.41  
The American public regretted its involvement in the Great War and rejected the greater 
international community in the 1920s. American society called for a move away from the affairs 
of the world and a return to isolationism. It was these very pressures that caused the U.S. Senate 
to reject the Treaty of Versailles, instead of creating bilateral ones with the defeated parties. 
These treaties did not bind the United States to the newly created League of Nations, allowing 
the U.S. to remain apart from the affairs of the other states. The separate peace treaties satisfied 
the American public and entrenched a staunch anti-interventionist attitude that lasted until 
December 1941.42 
Boot focuses primarily upon global trends during the Interwar period, 1919-1939. The 
world experienced a second industrial revolution during the early days of the 20th century, based 
upon oil and electricity. The automobile industry boomed in the 1920s. Militaries across the 
world, including the U.S., integrated automobiles into their force structure, forever tying 
logistical support to the truck. The interwar period continued this trend that had begun in earnest 
during the First World War. Within the U.S. half of the households owned an automobile by the 
mid-1930s, which made it easier for the Army to motorize.43 The decommissioning of military 
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aircraft used in the First World War spurred the development of commercial air travel. The 
civilian demand for air travel caused the development of more sophisticated aircraft with longer 
ranges, which also helped to improve military aircraft. Notably, the U.S. was the least involved 
in the militarization of aircraft out of the victors of World War I, due to America’s isolationist 
policies. Even so, the newly created airlines represented a kind of reserve force of trained pilots 
that could be drafted and equipped quickly if needed.44 Importantly, Boot claims that the Axis 
states spent the Interwar period “revolutioniz[ing] the art of war as thoroughly as Henry Ford had 
revolutionized individual transportation.”45 As Boot shows, the German Army developed its 
armor capabilities to fulfill a strategic role. Many of their early invasion strategies depended 
heavily upon the mobility and shock provided by massed armor units moving quickly. Likewise, 
the Soviet Union had developed their armor capabilities with operational mobility in mind, 
conforming to their doctrine of Deep Battle.46 British and French armor was underdeveloped and 
relegated to tactical support to infantry units and scouting.47 The British detached their tanks, 
which were lightly armored to infantry companies to act as scouts. American armor would be 
utilized similarly to the British, at a tactical level. 48     
In America, the conduct of World War I had been unlike any other war that America had 
fought, except as new military technologies were developed that should have vastly altered the 
conduct of war. However, General Pershing staunchly believed in the spirit of the rifleman and 
continued to view the rifleman as the most important weapon of war. He did not wish to alter the 
tactical training of American forces to incorporate the new technologies efficiently, as he feared 
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they would detract from the spirit of the attack. Following the war, a panel of Army officers 
founded the Superior Board, analyzed what was learned during the war, and the report suggested 
that the Army begin to further incorporate the new technologies with the rifleman. Mobility was 
another vital area identified as lacking.  General Pershing disagreed with their findings and 
suggested the Army keep its force structure and training programs unchanged.49 Additionally, he 
oversaw the almost instant downsizing of the Army from a height of one million soldiers down 
to an extremely small standing army caped at 500,000 soldiers, a number that would be cut again 
in the late 1920s. Most of these units were not well funded and lacked the equipment needed to 
conduct extensive military training. Additionally, as the economy worsened, the already slim 
defense budget was cut even more. Money that was once appropriated for the defense was re-
appropriated to other sectors of the economy leading to a difficult situation for the military. 
Promotions were slow, the public did not want to see large amounts of public funds allocated to 
the military.50  
Even so, the interwar years were crucial for developing the conduct of the Second World 
War. As airplane technology improved, the primitive missions of Army aviators during the First 
World War were replaced with a concept known as strategic air power. Strategic air power 
includes the idea that a war can be won with air power alone, involving massive bombing 
missions conducted against strategic targets in the enemy’s heartland. These targets were 
designed to remove both an enemy’s will and capacity to fight the war, though the Army Air 
Corps focused primarily on the capacity to fight.51 Therefore, many of these strategic targets 
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were economic nodes and civilian population centers. An industrial war cannot be waged without 
workers and factories to produce war materials. 52  Within the Air Corps, this idea gained a large 
following and greatly influenced the conduct of the Air Corps during the interwar period. The 
infantry, however, viewed the role of air power differently and desired for the Air Corps to 
develop close air support capabilities. This debate continued throughout the interwar period and 
through the Second World War.  
The role of tanks was also debated during the interwar period. Many different ideas and 
prototypes were proposed by the U.S. Army. As the American military budget was restricted 
during this period, the army had to rely primarily upon observations of other state's tests instead 
of constructing their prototypes en masse. To further complicate the development of the 
American tank was the views of some in the cavalry, who were fearful that the tank would 
remove them from their traditional horse-mounted roles. Some cavalry officers embraced the 
development of the tank as they correctly guessed that the tank would indeed replace the horse 
on the battlefield, and it would be wisest to not only accept the change but lead its development. 
This divide is the key reason why the massive field training exercises conducted in 1941 
included horse cavalry. Armor also played a role during the 1941 Louisiana Maneuvers, 
commanded by General George S. Patton.53 The success of tanks during the maneuvers and the 
rapid sacking of Belgium in 1940 using tanks were paramount to the rapid development of the 
American tank. Even so, American armor was not utilized in the same manner that other states 
used their armor. Before the war, doctrine was developed that envisioned the armor acting 
independently of every other arm in the army. In 1943 during combat operations in Tunisia, it 
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became apparent that the prewar doctrine developed was not effective, and the operational 
independence of U.S. armor was abandoned.  Instead, armor was attached to infantry units and 
provided tactical support in small unit teams. A platoon would have a light tank assigned to them 
to provide close tactical support and even provide cover from small arms fire. The role of U.S. 
armor would remain unchanged throughout the war.54   
These weapon systems were not the only technologies that were developed during the 
interwar period and had a substantial impact on combat operations. Communication technologies 
developed dramatically during the interwar period vastly improving the ability of commanders to 
directly influence the outcomes of the battle. Additionally, the improvements in communication 
technology allowed for political leadership to be involved in the conduct of the war in a manner 
that was not experienced before the war. President Franklin D. Roosevelt received reports from 
his theater commanders in almost real-time through phone lines and radio communication.  
Communication between allied leaders allowed for a tighter coalition that brought military 
operations together for superior coordination. While at face value this is not that different than 
what President Lincoln could do during the Civil War, the impact was different. For one, 
Roosevelt could directly communicate with his commanders and allies. While direct 
communication might not seem like a crucial step, it allowed for the president’s intent and 
message to be conveyed clear than before, as there was no middleman. Additionally, this reality 
also provided some sense of secrecy and security to the conversation, as the president, or 
commander could be alone in the room while the call was taking place, limiting the impact of 
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information leaks. Lastly, the telephone and radio allowed for a greater deal of information to be 
relayed from the tactical units on the front to the theater commanders, and in record time. 55 
In General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s own words, America was at the onset of the war in 
1939, in a state of “almost complete military weakness” but by the end of the war had 
transformed into the world’s military superpower.56 America had adopted a policy of military 
unpreparedness during the years following the Great War, believing that the isolationist desires 
of its populace would be enough to protect the nation from being dragged into war. When the 
situation in Europe and Asia darkened, the American population was still holding out hope that 
the war would stay outside of the Western Hemisphere, keeping America well out of it.57 Even 
so, Congress came to realize there was almost no chance that America would be able to stay out 
of the war, and passed the Selective Service Act in September 1940, creating the first peacetime 
draft. Congress and the President did not want to be forced to join the war without having a 
sizable military force already trained; due to America's involvement in the Great War, as it took 
almost a year for the first American troops to combat-ready once they arrived in France.58 Both 
the defense budget and the capping of the armed forces were increased to coincide with the draft. 
By the summer of 1941, the U.S. Army had a peacetime strength of 1,500,000 men, the largest 
peacetime army in American history. However, this Army was comprised of citizen-soldiers as 
draftees and National Guardsmen, who could not be active for more than twelve months nor 
serve extended periods outside the Western Hemisphere. In August 1941 Congress passed the 
Selective Service Extension Act by one vote, which granted authorization for the stationing of 
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any soldier regardless of their component anywhere in the world, while also extending service 
commitments for all enlistments through the Selective Service. Even so, it was clear that society 
had not fully accepted the idea that isolationism was going to fail, as the bill also released any 
man over 28 from service.59  
Within the Army itself, the same beliefs were held, that there were no reasons for 
urgency and therefore, many units were not yet training heavily until after the hasty evacuation 
of the British Army from Dunkirk in 1940.60 The events of December 7, 1941, proved to all, that 
officials calling for rapid military preparedness were not seeing things that were not present. 
Instead, the senior leaders and politicians who were leading the war planning effort that began in 
1939, despite the general view of society were the saviors of the country when quick and 
decisive action was needed.61 The Louisiana and Carolina Maneuvers in 1941 had given many 
Army officers the field experience needed to deal with the sudden influx of orders that were 
coming from Washington following the attack. The standard process for issuing orders was 
abandoned due to the urgency of the situation. More aspects of the order were left to the lower 
levels of command, something that was not done prior.62 The junior levels of command were not 
often granted much leeway in carrying out their orders, as every order was carefully drawn out to 
include every aspect of the plan. However, the junior officer was given an intended end state and 
was told to find a way to execute the mission without a carefully drafted plan sent from a higher 
headquarters.  
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This decentralization of orders to the junior officer that occurred during the days 
following the attack on Pearl Harbor proved to be the start of changes to the way the U.S. Army 
operated and planned missions at all levels of command. The changes impacted the uppermost 
levels of military command, strategic command underwent many different developments, often 
learning from the harsh lessons of operational combat. While technological aspects played a role 
in the changing command environment it is not necessarily the only factor that played a crucial 
role in the changes. Political necessity, the feelings of the population, and military necessity 
certainly played a role in these developments. The American President and the War Department 
were constantly giving advice and instruction to Chief of Staff of Army General George C. 
Marshall that required him to consider their views while assigning missions and constructing his 
pathway to victory. The office of the Chief of Staff was where the impact of society and politics 
collided. The American public during their isolationist years held a sentiment against any activity 
undertaken by the Federal government or the military that was outward-facing in nature. This 
naturally included intelligence services, the public was strongly opposed to anything that might 
even suggest that the United States government was involved in spying. Therefore, the War 
Department and the branches of the military were woefully incompetent at intelligence gathering 
and analysis. General Marshall saw the need to restructure the intelligence capabilities of the 
Army just before the war and had plans drafted to increase the capabilities, however, the war 
began before the changes could be implemented. Even so, General Marshall ensured that the 
intelligence capabilities of the United States Army were developed during the early days of 
American involvement in the war, convincing Congress and the American people of the need to 
have a strong intelligence apparatus.63 While the individual services had some intelligence 
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capabilities, it was identified that the U.S. was not able to effectively gather, share, or receive 
intelligence from allies. The British helped to fill this gap by assisting with the creation of the 
office of Coordinator of Information in 1941. The following year the president ordered that the 
office be reorganized and strengthened, becoming the Office of Strategic Services or OSS. OSS 
would eventually be replaced by the CIA.64 
General Marshall was at the center of the command structure of the Army and was the 
driving force for the development of the culture of the Army. The way that General Marshall 
operated and the kind of traits he sought in his generals was quite different from any of his 
predecessors. Once General Marshall was appointed as the Chief of Staff, he began a strict 
reorganization process of the Army’s senior leadership, removing officers who were not willing 
to adapt. Officers that possessed growth mindsets and were willing to not only make tough 
decisions but innovate were rewarded while those who had been in the Army for thirty years 
were retired. General Marshall developed a system of meritocracy that promoted many junior 
officers to high-ranking positions over officers with seniority.65 A key example of this was when 
General Marshall promoted Eisenhower to the rank of brigadier general, the youngest of the 
officers promoted by Marshall.  General Eisenhower proved that the Marshall method of 
promotions worked, as General Eisenhower would prove to be one of the finest generals during 
the war. Additionally, the commanding general of the Ninth Army General William Simpson 
was an embodiment of the ideals that General Marshall had been trying to instill into the army. 
During the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944, Simpson ensured that the battle was won, by 
sending multiple divisions to the Bulge without seeking any fanfare or fame before the better-
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known Patton did. General Simpson believed it was crucial to develop his subordinates and 
therefore would often ensure that they would be the ones to receive their due credit for their 
division's actions on the battlefield.66 
Many aspects of the war effort were not decided out of military necessity, rather political 
necessity. For instance, the decision of where the Allies would launch operations against 
Germany was completely political. The political and military leaders of the United States desired 
to invade the European continent as soon as U.S. troops could be massed in the United Kingdom. 
The leaders of the United Kingdom, however, disagreed and adamantly believed that a 
Mediterranean first approach was needed, in part to protect their imperial interests. American 
leaders were willing to concede and allowed the British to plan a Mediterranean Sea approach.67 
A prime example of the impact that geopolitics and social factors had upon strategic 
decisions in 1942 was Operation Torch, the invasion of French Northern Africa. General 
Marshall and his advisors were against the idea of a military strategy that called for extensive 
military action in the Mediterranean Sea. Instead, they proposed to prepare a Cross Channel 
invasion as quickly as possible, without diverting strength to any other region. They viewed any 
possible action in the Mediterranean as serving only the political designs of British Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill. President Roosevelt did not share the same viewpoint as his 
generals, believing the Mediterranean campaign was a necessary political sacrifice needed to not 
only ensure British aid in the Pacific after Germany was defeated, but that the British Home 
Front would be able to sustain the war. Therefore, against the advice of his generals President 
Roosevelt agreed to the strategy proposed by Churchill.68 All attempts were made to make the 
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operation appear as though it was conducted primarily by the United States, as it was believed by 
both British and American senior leaders that the French forces stationed there would not 
respond well to seeing a British invasion force landing on their beaches.69 The Allies were 
fearful that the French forces would view these British liberators as their traditional enemy and 
fight bitterly against them. The political leaders of the war effort were convinced that the 
impression that the force was American in composition would be crucial to ensure that the 
French forces quickly surrendered after putting up weak resistance and join with the Americans 
in liberating Northern Africa. While it is true that the British were already present in the region 
before Operation Torch, they were not in the French-controlled regions making the invasion lead 
by U.S. General Dwight D. Eisenhower crucial to removing Axis forces from Northern Africa. 
For the political leaders of the United States, there was another crucial aspect to this invasion 
that demanded an American commander. Throughout all American history the Army had never 
conducted an unprovoked aggressive attack against a natural state, and since Vichy France took 
over in 1940 France was a neutral state with no hostilities towards the Americans. The fear was 
that Americans would be deeply concerned by the invasion and public support for the war might 
be lost rather quickly. The perception of public sentiment is part of the reason American troops 
oversaw the operation, they were to limit their hostile intentions until it became clear that the 
French would not surrender, at which point British reserves would be committed to increasing 
the tempo of combat operations.70 
Additionally, the way the Allied forces organized their military command structure 
reflected the impacts of sociopolitical factors more so than those of technology. The military 
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forces that were committed into a theater were reorganized into combined units comprised of 
both U.S. forces and those from the British Empire, though the integration did not end there. The 
theater command was joint in nature, this means that all services that were committed to the 
theater were involved in the force structure. A delicate political solution was created to deal with 
the issues of ultimate command of a theater, the state that provided the most servicemembers in 
the theater would be the state that would provide the commander. Likewise, the service of the 
commander was determined by the very nature of the operation, this method meant that if the 
operation were primarily dependent on naval might, a naval officer would be appointed as the 
joint commander.71 The unified command structure was an important system to work out, as 
coalition forces in the past have struggled to create a unified command structure, which in turn 
has caused many coalitions to suffer and fail to achieve the desired political goal. An identified 
unified command also has positive impacts upon the common soldier, as they have an 
understanding of just whom they are fighting for and why they are under the command of 
another state’s military. For example, the unified allied landings in Normandy on June 6, 1944, 
demonstrated the benefits of a unified command structure and allied cooperation. Every service 
member involved in the operation had a clear understanding of what they had to do when they 
had to do it, and most importantly why they had to do it. Providing purpose and understanding is 
a crucial part of the job of a leader.72  
While the issue of command of the Allied invasion of French northern Africa was a 
matter of social-political importance, the strategic aspects of the operation were controlled by 
technological aspects. When General Eisenhower was selecting his headquarters and the 
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assembly point for the invasion, technological aspects were the single greatest limiting factor. In 
the end, the General decided to base his operation out of British-held Gibraltar. There was a 
simple reason as to why Gibraltar was selected as both a headquarters and the assembly area for 
the invasion, the Allied Navies were unable to provide any aircraft carriers and therefore any air 
cover had to be launched from the ground. The only place that the Allies could provide air cover 
was Gibraltar which would also limit the scope of the invasion, as aircover could only be 
provided to the invasion force within the limited range of the ground-based fighters.73 
The interplay between technology and sociopolitical forces during the war in Europe 
might be most prominent in the war in the sky. Military air power, as already noted, had been 
developed at an astonishing pace during the interwar years. The commanders of the Army Air 
Corps were frantic to test out their new theories and capabilities of their air fleets. Many of the 
same ideas that the Americans had developed were already being put into practice by the airmen 
of the Royal Air Force, namely area carpet bombing of strategic economic nodes conducted at 
night. Strategically, this kind of bombing campaign made sense, it provided relative security to 
the bombers as well as tangible impacts upon the morale of the enemy and their war effort.74 
Even so, the American government did not allow its Army Air Corps to conduct these kinds of 
operations, electing to conduct daytime precision bombing instead starting in the summer of 
1942. This kind of bombing required bombers to fly combat missions during the day at relatively 
low altitudes and slower speeds than their British counterparts. These factors combined to create 
a horrible casualty rate for the Army Air Corps, as German anti-aircraft batteries and fighters 
were easily able to pick off the bombers, who did not have long-range escorts until the P-51 
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Mustang was developed. The United States government accepted these losses on a moral ground, 
believing it was better democratically in 1943 for losses to be high than to indiscriminately 
attack unarmed civilians during terror bombing campaigns. The hope was that these precision 
bombing missions would limit the destruction to only the strategic node and not surrounding 
homes and schools.  
Strategic nodes are focal points in a belligerent’s war effort. Often this means factories 
producing weapons, food, aircraft, textiles, ball bearings, or telecommunication and logistical 
hubs. Arguments could and have been made that civilian population centers are strategic nodes. 
Due to the limitations of aiming technology, the intent was not always achieved, as bombs often 
missed their targets and struck residential areas.75 It must be noted that the reluctance to use 
indiscriminate strategic bombing in Europe did not present itself in the Pacific. This difference in 
strategy is perhaps due to social factors, Europeans have been seen as the cousins of Americans, 
while anti-Asian sentiments had been the norm for quite some time in the United States, even 
before the events of Pearl Harbor. Additionally, the events of Dresden in 1945 and the U.S. 
public’s desensitization to widescale violence by the time that U.S. bombers were in range of 
mainland Japan could have created a social climate that permitted area bombing of civilian 
population centers. American media did not even view the events of Dresden as being worthy of 
being front page, instead, American papers were covering the Yalta Conference.76   During the 
early stages of war planning in the Pacific, Air Command had investigated the strategic value of 
incendiary bombs in Japan. They argued that since many buildings in Japan were constructed 
using wood and paper that incendiary bombs would be extremely effective against civilian 
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population centers. Factories and economic buildings were more likely to be made of stronger, 
less-flammable materials. However, the plans to begin firebombing were not approved right 
away due to real concerns about the legality and morality of such a bombing strategy.77  
Throughout the war in Europe, there existed a tense interplay between three factors, 
military necessity, technology, and social-political factors. At times each of these three factors 
limited the war effort, while at other times the factors in unison propelled the war effort forward. 
At the divisional levels and lower, commanders began to develop doctrine and methods to deal 
with the harsh interplay between what needed to be done militarily and what society would allow 
to happen. The war in Europe was less brutal than the one in the Pacific and there is an argument 
to be made that restraint was caused by social factors. When it was at all possible the lives of 
civilians were to be minimally affected while conducting offensive operations in Europe and 
Northern Africa. This restraint extended to the citizens of Germany for much of the war, with the 
most horrific exception of Dresden. The horrors of American area firebombing only occurred in 
Europe once, while it became a nightly occurrence in the heartland of Japan. While the impact of 
the rapid technology change was evident during World War Two, social factors were more 
impactful in the development of a U.S. strategy.  
Assessments 
It is undoubtedly true that both technology and society have had a substantial impact on 
the development of America's modern army. Technology has had a defining impact upon the 
development of military strategy throughout human history. Changes in military technologies 
allowed armies to gain advantages over their adversaries. Take for example the development of 
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the English longbow during the 100 Years War, its longer range and higher draw weight proved 
to be catastrophic for the French.78 The addition of a stirrup to saddles greatly increased the 
lethality of cavalry units. Every time technology creates an inherent advantage a countermeasure 
is eventually worked out. The countermeasure is not always technological in nature, oftentimes it 
has included changing the shape of formations or the basic battlefield movement techniques 
used. Modern militaries all over the world today employ movement techniques designed to limit 
the amount of time a soldier is moving exposed in the open. As late as the Russo-Japanese War, 
these kinds of tactics were seen as cowardly and were therefore not employed.79 The U.S. Army 
would not begin to use these movement techniques until experiencing battle during World War I. 
Technology, namely deadlier and more accurate enemy fire, mandated a change in military 
doctrine that was deeply rooted in a societal belief.80 Without a shift in the perception of soldiers, 
the acceptance of these new movement methods would never have happened.  
The interplay between technology and society is very important, as society developed, it 
seems as though militaries had to ask permission from political leadership to utilize new 
technologies. Permission was not necessarily implicit or required, but as society developed 
throughout the 1800s, citizens gained more oversight over what their governments did, including 
on the battlefield. No longer could militaries take drastic action in the name of military necessity 
without considering the impact this would have domestically. Particularly of the U.S., as the U.S. 
is a republic and public sentiment is very important. The American president, the person who 
establishes the political objective for the war, is shackled to public approval and will not approve 
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any drastic measures that run counter to the beliefs of the masses if they want to be reelected. 
President Lincoln was aware of this reality during the Civil War and was concerned that unless 
the U.S. could make headway against the Confederacy that he would not be reelected in 1864. 
General Grant was able to win enough battles during the election year that the American people 
chose to support the president. This support and the overwhelming hatred for the rebellion, in 
turn, allowed America’s strategy to slip towards totality.81  
Throughout the Second World War the American public was acutely aware of what the 
U.S. Army was doing in Europe and as the war developed restrain was less important to the 
public. Throughout the war, the British advocated for large-scale night-time area bombing in 
Europe, and even after the creation of the unified bomber command, U.S. bombers were not 
allowed to conduct these kinds of bombing raids. Strategically they made more sense, as the 
casualty rates for these high-altitude nighttime bombing runs were better than the low altitude 
daytime precision bombing that the United States conducted. Therefore, the decision for the U.S. 
to conduct these kinds of bombing runs must have been sociopolitical and tied to the sentiments 
of the American people. The loosening of restraint which occurred in the final year of the war 
allowed for new military technologies to be fully utilized, such as nighttime area bombing and 
the firebombing of Dresden which occurred during the Spring of 1945. The implicit consent of 
the American people of firebombing allowed for U.S. forces in the Pacific to conduct multiple 
area firebombing campaigns. 82 Additionally, the delicate nature of the Anglo-American alliance 
required President Roosevelt to make strategic decisions that went against the advice of his 
military advisers. Operation Torch and the Mediterranean-first strategy are examples of the 
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82 Millett, Maslowski, and Feis, For the Common Defense, 477-478. 
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president making political decisions and placing them about the advice of his military chiefs of 
staff. During the war, the president and Prime Minister Churchill were deeply concerned with 
creating a new political system out of the ashes of Europe. The two leaders devoted time during 
their conferences to discuss their goals for a post-war Europe and the world, to achieve these 
goals certain measures had to be met, which included showing restraint when dealing with the 
German people once the invasion of Germany began. Militarily it would have been easier to not 
care about the aftermath of the war and speed as quickly as possible into Berlin with wanton 
disregard, but this is not what happened.  
Strategic-level commanders do not make choices in a vacuum. The sentiments of their 
citizens, their political leaders, and the sentiments of allied states all influence commander's 
decisions. The world has become a global society where the views of other states and even non-
state entities hold real weight. International watchdogs such as the United Nations closely 
monitor military action in an attempt to limit undue suffering and war crimes. International 
watchdogs are not a new phenomenon, the international community has been attempting to limit 
the destructive impact of war since the 1800s by signing international treaties such as The Hague 
and the Geneva Conventions. Society has forced the outright ban of the use of some military 
technology, in turn forcing a change in doctrine. For example, the use of chemical weapons 
against enemy combatants is internationally illegal, the United States has taken this ban seriously 
and has reframed from employing chemical weapons. 83Additionally, after a lengthy 
international campaign, the use of indiscriminate land mines has also been banned, creating a 
need to update military doctrine.    
 
83 Boot, War Made New, 451-452.  
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Technology creates opportunities for strategic commanders on the battlefield and the 
potential to drastically change the doctrine of their forces, this is undeniable. However, 
opportunity alone does not create change, action and permission do. Society is the force that 
allows for strategic commanders to employ new technologies and techniques, shaping military 
doctrine in the process. What good is a new weapon system if the use of that weapon has been 
made illegal by that state's legislator? If society does not approve of the way the army is 
conducting war, then that government will be voted out and in a volunteer force, people will not 
join the ranks. Additionally, military equipment must be purchased through public funds 
appropriated by Congress, and this oversight prevents the purchase of weapons that are not 
socially accepted. Therefore, I believe that social factors have a larger impact upon the 
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